Policy discussion on tax coordination
The project aims to contribute to policy discussions on tax competition and tax coordination in the EU, particularly in the area of capital income taxes. A number of initiatives have been taken in the past decade. First, proposals for a European withholding tax on interest date from the late eighties, but countries have never agreed upon its introduction. Currently, the EU is again discussing a proposal in which countries can choose between either a minimum withholding tax on interest, or a system of information exchange across banks and fiscal authorities.
1 Second, the Ruding Report of 1992 proposed a minimum corporate income tax rate in the EU and harmonization of the tax base. Also this proposal has never been approved. Recently, similar proposals have been done by EU member states. In this discussion, some economists have suggested a so-called minimum asset tax (MAT), based on a simplified tax base ( Van Wijnbergen and Estache, 1999) . Others have plead for the introduction of a comprehensive business income tax (Cnossen, 1996) or a tax on business cash flow (Gordon, 1996) . A third initiative is the code of conduct on business taxation by the European Com-mission. This code should prohibit harmful tax practices by individual member states. The OECD has initiated a similar code of conduct (OECD, 1998) . In our project, we review the various tax proposals and discuss their welfare implications on the basis of theoretical and empirical insights.
Research questions
What are the costs and benefits of different forms/proposals of tax coordination? Which factors determine these costs and benefits?
Is there evidence for the presence of tax competition in the EU? How strong is the convergence tendency of tax structures?
What can we say empirically about the behavioral impacts of differences in tax structures in the EU, e.g. on foreign direct investment and tax avoidance?
Analytical framework
We will develop a small prototype economic model to formally illustrate the costs and benefits of policy coordination in general and tax coordination in particular. The model will describe international capital flows in a general equilibrium context (see e.g. Westerhout, 1997) . It will draw on existing literature on tax competition and tax coordination which has explored different types of taxes on capital income and different types of public expenditures (Wilson, 1999) .
2 To understand how different institutions in capital income taxation affect economic behavior, we will also look at the theoretical literature on corporate income taxation (Sinn, 1987) .
The models will be used to review the literature on tax competition. Theoretical models help us in understanding the foundations for tax coordination, and they illustrate the transmission channels through which it affects the economy --both in the community and in individual member states. The models will also force us to provide sound definitions of concepts and institutions. For instance, what do countries compete at and what is the nature of tax competition? A related question is who are the winners and losers from policy coordination, e.g. if countries differ in size. Furthermore, we will discuss what is meant by coordination, thereby referring to the different proposal mentioned above.
Comparative analysis
We will describe various institutions in the field of capital income taxes in the EU and some other important industrialized countries. First of all, we will make a rough comparison of (developments in) tax systems in several countries, e.g. by describing fractions of different taxes in total tax revenue, nominal tax rates, average and marginal effective tax rates on capital, and capital income tax bases (see e.g. Chennells and Griffith, 1997; OECD Revenue Statistics, 1998; Devereux and Griffith, 1998) . Second, we pay attention to structural differences in various rules across countries, such as the tax deductibility of interest payments, tax deferral, loss compensation, depreciation rules, double taxation of distributed profits, and several tax incentives (OECD, 1991; IBFD, 1999) . Finally, we explore the opportunities (and also international allocation rules) for tax avoidance by multilateral enterprises --e.g. through foreign tax credits/deductions, transfer pricing, royalty payments, and interest payments. Besides, we pay attention to the tax treatment of domestic and foreign profits, and existing tax treaties across countries. Careful investigation of these developments may reveal an indication for the presence of tax competition in the EU. In this connection, we also look at studies that directly test for the presence of tax competition by estimating reaction functions (see e.g. Brueckner and Saavedra, 1998; Buttner, 1999) .
Empirical research
An important element in the literature on tax competition is the degree of capital mobility. Many models on tax competition assume that capital is perfectly mobile across borders. This assumption is typically violated in practice, especially for real capital. We will review developments in indicators on capital market integration, both within the EU and between the EU and other countries. For instance, we may look at FDI flows, differences in the real rate of return to investment, the correlation between domestic saving and investment, interest rate differentials, and the degree of specialization of portfolios in domestic securities (home bias) (see e.g. Lemmen, 1998) . Theoretical literature may help us to explain why capital is less than perfectly mobile than usually assumed (see e.g. Feldstein, 1994; Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996) . This may teach us how European integration will affect the degree of capital mobility in the future.
We will also review the more specialized empirical literature on the responsiveness of investment and profits to corporate income tax differentials. This empirical literature almost exclusively considers US data. Part of this American evidence suggests that corporate income tax rates have important effects on FDI. Furthermore, tax differentials cause profit shifting by affecting dividend-, interest-and royalty payments of foreign subsidiaries to their parent American companies (Hines, 1999) . We will explore whether these results would carry over to the European economy or whether different institutions in the EU would imply different results. We will also look at studies on the impact of withholding taxes on interest on the allocation of financial assets. Indeed, withholding taxes on interest in EU countries have been adjusted 47 times between 1989 and 1996. It seems that this has induced massive capital flows across EU countries.
We will put effort in finding appropriate data to perform empirical analysis. For instance, we will look for data on financial capital assets hold by financial institutes, data on property, plant and equipment or FDI, and a time series of effective corporate tax rates for different EU countries.
